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Powell v. Commonwealth
590 S.E.2d 537 (Va. 2004)
I. Facts
In 2000, a jury sentenced Paul Warner Powell ("Powell") to death for the
capital murder of StaceyLynn Reed ("Stacey ') during or subsequent to the rape
and sodomy of her sister, Kristie Erin Reed ("Kristie").' After the Supreme
Court of Virginia reversed Powell's death sentence and remanded to the trial
court for a new trial, the Commonwealth of Virginia issued a new indictment
against Powell on December 3,2001, alleging the capital murder of Staceyin the
" 'commission of or subsequent to the attempted rape of Stacey...' "2 The
new indictment was based on evidence contained in a profanity-filled letter
written and sent by Powell to the Commonwealth's Attorney who prosecuted
him in his first trial.' In the letter, believing he was immune from further prose-
cution, Powell related what had happened the day Stacey was murdered and
confessed that he had attempted to rape Stacey before the actual killing.'
Powell's second trial ended with a verdict of guilty and another sentence of
death.'
Powell made several motions pre-trial, including two separate motions to
dismiss the second indictment on serial prosecution, "law of the case," and
1. Powell v. Commonwealth, 590 S.E.2d 537, 543 (Va. 2004); s&VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-
3 1(5) (Michie Supp. 2003) (defining capital murder as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible
sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration"); Powell v. Commonwealth,
552 S.E.2d 344, 363 (Va. 2001) (reversing Powell's sentence of death and ordering a new trial
limited to a charge of first degree murder). For a complete discussion and analysis of Povd4 sie
gm=y Kathryn Roe Eldrge, Case Note, 14 CAP. DEF.J. 175 (2001) (analyzing Powell v. Com-
monwealth, 552 S.E.2d 344 (Va. 2001)).
2. P=ra4 590 S.E.2d at 543-44. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Powell's death
sentence due to the fact that the Commonwealth could not prove that" 'Powell committed or
attempted to commit any sexual assault against Staceybefore or during her murder, or that the rape
of Kristie did not occur after the murder of her sister.'" Id at 543 (quoting Poa 552 S.E.2d at
363).
3. Id
4. Id In the letter Powell stated," 'I figured I would tell you the rest of what happened on
Jan. 29, 1999, to show you how stupid all y'all... are.'" Id Powell described how he threatened
Staceyand pinned her down on the bed when she refused to have consensual intercourse with him.
Id He threatened to kill her if she did not stop fighting him. Id When Stacey refused to disrobe
for Powell, he stabbed her when she tried to leave the bedroom. Id When this attack did not kill
her, Powell" 'started stomping on her throat' until he 'didn't see her breathing anymore.'" Id
5. Id at 549.
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double jeopardy grounds.6 Powell also filed motions seeking to have Virginia's
capital charging and sentencing scheme declared unconstitutional and challenging
the constitutionality of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B).' All of these mo-
tions were overruled by the trial court! Powell appealed to the Supreme Court
of Virginia claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred in overruling the pre-trial
motions and not striking the jury panel.9 Along with its mandatory review of
Powell's death sentence under Virginia Code section 17.1-313, the Fourth Crcuit
analyzed Powell's claim that the sentence was a result of the jury's passion,
prejudice, or other arbitraryfactors and that the sentence of death was dispropor-
tionate when compared to the penalty imposed in similar cases."
I Hddig
First, the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled that the trial court did not err in
failing to dismiss the December 3, 2001 indictment." The court held that: (1)
the opinion and mandate of the court from Powell's initial appeal was not a
barrier to the Commonwealth issuing a new indictment; (2) Powell's first trial did
not act as an actual or implied acquittal for the attempted rape of Stacey under
the law of the case doctrine; and (3) that constitutional double jeopardyprinciples
were not implicated due to the failure of the initial indictment to identify the
victim of the attempted rape charge." Second, the court held that the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Rng v A nzona" did not make Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.4(B) unconstitutional. "4 Third, the court found that the trial
court did not err in issuing an instruction to the jury to disregard a voir dire
question rather than dismiss the panel." Finally, the court held that Powell's
death sentence was not the result of the jury's passion, prejudice, or any other
6. I at 544-45; see US. CONST. amend. V (No person shall be .. . subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.").
7. Poudl 590 S.E.2d at 545-46; sw VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003)
(providing the procedure for capital sentencing in Virginia).
8. PowZ 590 S.E.2d at 544-47.
9. Id at 549-53, 559-60.
10. Id at 549, 560-63; sa' VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313 (Michie 2003) (providing for the
mandatory review of every death sentence).
11. Id at 549-54.
12. Id at 550, 553, 554-55.
13. 536 US. 584 (2002).
14. Potl, 590 S.E.2d at 555; see Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (holding that it
is unconstitutional in a jury trial for a trial judge, and not the jury, to determine the presence of
aggravating factors needed to impose the penalty of death).
15. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 560.
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arbitrary factor and the sentence was not disproportionate when compared with
similar cases. 6
X.I A msis
A. Failwe to Disniss the C1 Munierlriarwt
Powell's claim that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the second
indictment was brought on the following three grounds: (1) the opinion and
mandate issued bythe court prevented the second indictment; (2) the law of the
case doctrine prevented the prosecution from relying on a charge of the at-
tempted rape of Stacey, and (3) that the second indictment violated the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy prohibition." The Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected each of these contentions."
1. The "Mardk" Rule and Serial Prseai
At trial, Powell claimed that the second indictment should have been
dismissed because the trial court was bound bythe Supreme Court of Virginia's
opinion and mandate issued after his first appeal. 9 The Commonwealth re-
sponded by asserting that the Supreme Court of Viginia's judgment had no
bearing on the subsequent indictment "because Powell had 'never [previously]
been charged with the capital murder of Stacey Reed in the commission or
attempted commission [of] sexual assault against [Stacey Reed] because, at the
time of [Powell's first] trial, no such evidence existed.' "20 Thus, the Common-
wealth argued that the new "indictment was 'a new charge, one that has never
been litigated in trial nor considered bythe Virginia Supreme Court.'" 2 The trial
court overruled Powell's motion to dismiss.22
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the mandate rule was recognized
by the court as stated in Romt v Roue.23
A trial judge is bound by a decision and mandate from [an appellate
court], unless [the court] acted outside [its] jurisdiction. A trial court
has no discretion to disregard [a] lawful mandate. When a case is
remanded to a trial court forom an appellate court, the refusal of the
16. Id at 561-62.
17. Id at 549.
18. Id at 550, 553, 554-56.
19. Id at 544.
20. Id
21. Pou, 590 S.E.2d at 544-45.
22. Id at 545.
23. 532 S.E.2d 908 (Va. C. App. 2000).
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trial court to follow the appellate court mandate constitutes reversible
error.
24
The Supreme Court of Virginia differentiated between the characteristics of an
opinion, which applies to all future cases, and a mandate, "which is the directive
of the appellate court certifying a judgment in a particular case to the court from
which it was appealed." 2 The court noted that, by necessity, the mandate only
applies to that particular case and onlyto matters" 'within its compass.' 26 The
court concluded that the trial court is not precluded from considering matters
outside of the mandate."
The court found that the discovery of new evidence, i.e., Powell's letter to
the Commonwealth's Attorney, brought the new indictment outside the scope
of the mandate rule.28 The mandate was issued based on the record that the
court had at the time, and any new evidence discovered fell outside of the man-
date's requirements .29 The court also found that nothing in the mandate forbade
the Commonwealth from dismissing the first indictment and issuing a second
indictment charging capital murder based on a different gradation offense.'0
Powell's confession to the attempted rape of Staceygave the Commonwealth the
evidence it needed to charge him with the attempted rape of Staceyas a predicate
rather than the attempted rape of Kristie."1
The court further acknowledged that, as a general rule, "serial prosecutions
are not permitted where the Commonwealth deliberately refrains from bringing
criminal charges arising out of the same act or transaction while prosecuting
others in order to gain the advantage of having multiple trials." 32 The court
found that in Powell's case, unlike the case of ddiieratdy prosecuting a defendant
in separate trials forthe same series of offenses, the unexpected discoveryof new
evidence pertaining to an uncharged offense made it impossible to have prose-
cuted him the first time for the attempted rape of Stacey." Accordingly, the
court ruled that the trial court did not err in overruling Powell's motion to
dismiss the indictment based on the discovery of new evidence of the gradation
offense. 4
24. Portad1 590 S.E.2d at 549 (quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 532 S.E.2d 908, 912 (Va. Ct. App.
2000)); Row, 532 S.E.2d at 912.
25. Poud4 590 S.E.2d at 550.
26. Id (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168 (1939)).
27. Id
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
31. Poue!, 590 S.E.2d at 550.
32. Id (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
33. Id
34. Id
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2. 7 Lawf qde Case Dor
Powell claimed that the failure of the indictment or jury instructions to
charge him with either the attempted rape of Stacey or specify the victim of the
attempted rape gradation offense resulted in an implied acquittal of the attempted
rape of Staceyunder the law of the case doctrine? To support this contention
Powell ass erted that the Commonwealth presented evidence that Stacey's murder
involved a sexual assault and that the jury had considered and rejected the
possibility that Powell attempted to rape Stacey.6 The court rejected these
assertions by noting that the bill of particulars issued in response to Powell's
motion clearly indicated that the gradation offense was the attempted rape of
Kristie. 7 The court found that the bill of particulars was not irrelevant, as Powell
claimed, and that the bill of particulars limited the prosecution to the capital
murder of Staceybased on the attempted rape of Kristie. s The court agreed that
a bill of particulars is not a charging document but noted that when a bill of
particulars is issued, it must be read together with the indictment to determine
the details of a charged offense. 9 The court concluded that when the indictment
and the bill of particulars charging Powell were read together, the prosecution of
Powell was limited to the capital murder of Stacey predicated on the attempted
rape of Kristie."
The court also rejected Powell's claim that statements in the Supreme Court
of Virginia's opinion reversing his first conviction acted as an express acquittal
of the attempted rape of Stacey.1 In reversing Powell's capital murder charge,
the court had stated that there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove
that Powell had attempted to rape Stacey.2 Powell relied on Bwks v Unitai
Stat 4' for the proposition that "the determination of an appellate court that the
trial court erred in permitting the juryto consider a charge not supported bythe
evidence acts as an acquittal on that charge and that a retrial for the same offense
35. Id at 550-51.
36. Id Poweil pointed to the fact that the prosecution proffered at trial that it had "evidence
... [that Powell) was having sex or attempting to have sex with [Stacey]" to support his contention
that the Commonweakh tried to prove the attempted rape of Stacey. Id at 551. To support his
contention that the jury had considered and rejected that Powell attempted to rape Stacey, Powell
noted that the jury had inquired whether the attempted rape of Kristie would satisfy the gradation
requirement for Staceys murder. Id
37. Poud4 590 S.E2d at 552.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id
41. Id at 553.
42. Id
43. 437 US. 1 (1978).
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is barred bythe prohibition against double jeopardy."" The court found that its
original reversal and mandate requiring a charge of no greater than first degree
murder were based on the evidence available in the record of the first trial and
did not take into account Powell's confession in the letter, which was discovered
after the initial reversal.4" The court held that "the trial court did not err in
denying Powell's motions to dismiss the indictment."46
3. D bleJeq~amiy
Powell next contended that the December 3, 2001 indictment should have
been dismissed on Fifth Amendment double jeopardy grounds." Specifically,
Powell claimed that the double jeopardy prohibition invalidated the second
indictment for the capital murder of Staceyunder the same subsection of Virginia
Code section 18.2-31."8 Powell's argument depended on the fact that no victim
of attempted rape was specified in the first indictment and, as such, the proof of
the identity of the victim was not an element of the crime.49 Under this theory,
it did not matter whether Stacey or Kristie was the victim of the gradation
offense in the first indictment and, thus, the second indictment specifying Stacey
as the victim violated the Fifth Amendment.'
The court, finding that the bill of particulars cured any lack of specificity in
the first indictment, disagreed with this argument.5 ' The court noted that the
identification of Kristie as the victim of attempted rape in the bill of particulars
occurred prior to the point when jeopardy attached upon the impaneling of the
jury.2 The court held that:
ere, prior to the attachment of jeopardy, the Commonwealth
mts the prosecution of a capital murder, undifferentiated in the
indictment by the identity of the victim of the gradation offense, by
naming a specific victim of the gradation offense in a bill of particu-
44. Poudl, 590 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1978)); Bwks,
437 U.S. at 5-6.
45. Pomed, 590 S.E.2d at 552.
46. Id at 553.
47. Id
48. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(5) (vfichie Supp. 2003) (providing that murder
committed in conjunction with rape or attempted rape qualifies as capital murder).
49. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 553.
50. Id at 553-54.
51. Id at 554.
52. Id; see Commonwealth v. Washington, 559 S.E.2d 636, 641 (Va. 2002) ('The right not
to be subjected to double jeopardy attaches in a criminal case when the jury is impaneled and
sworn.").
[Vol. 16:2
POWELL V COMMONWEALTH
lars, jeopardy will attach only to the capital murder charge as made
specific bytle bill of particulars."
The court concluded that the trial court properly denied Powell's motion to
dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds. 4
B. Cci titandi j Vnzm's aptal Murder Sr
Powell argued that Rug "requires that many of the procedural safeguards
that heretofore have onlybeen required during the guilt/innocence phase of trial
must now be extended to the sentencing phase."" The aggravating factors
required to be found in order to impose the death penalty under Virginia Code
section 19.2-264.4(B) should be treated as elements of the capital offense charged
in the indictment. 6 Because Rin held that aggravating factors are elements of
the charged offense, it was unconstitutional during a jurytrial for a trial judge to
determine the presence of aggravating factors, rather than the jury.7 Powell
claimed that the holding in Rig made the standards of proof and rules of evi-
dence required in the guilt phase of trial mandatory at sentencing."8 Moreover,
under section 19.2-264.4(B), a "relaxed evidentiary standard" existed for the
admission of unadjudicated criminal conduct (violating the rule against the
admissibility of prior bad acts) or hearsay evidence (preventing proper cross-
examination required by the confrontation clause).,9
The court first found that Powell's reading of Rigwas too expansive.6" The
court noted that the ruling in Rizgpertained to the Arizona statutoryscheme that
allowed a trial judge "to assume the role of the jury in determining whether
53. Poud4 590 S.E2d at 554.
54. Id
55. Id at 555 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Rbg 536 U.S. at 609 (stating that
aggravating factors are elements of the offense to be found by the jury and not the trial judge).
56. Poud, 590 S.E2d at 555; VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie Supp. 2003). Section
19.2-264.4(B) states in pertinent part:
In cases of trial by jury, evidence may be presented as to any matter which the court
deems relevant to sentence ....
Evidence which may be admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing
admissib , may indude the circumstances surroundi. the offense, the hbstorya
background of the defendant, and any other facts i mitigation of the offense.
VA. CODE ANN. § 192-264.4(B).
57. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 555.
58. Id
59. Id (internal quotation marks omitted); see U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal
poecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
M"); Scates v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 756, 761 (Va. 2001) (restating the general rule "that
evidence of other offenses should be excluded if offered merely for the purpose of showing that
the accused was likely to commit the crime charged in the indictment").
60. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 555.
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aggravating factors ... were present" and not to the "broader issues of due
process protections afforded in the penalty determination phase of all capital
murder trials." 6' The court also found that there was not a "relaxed evidentiary
standard" during the sentencing phase in Virginia.62 The court stated that
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) "expressly provides, and we have consis-
tently held, that the Commonwealth must prove the existence of one or both
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt." 63 Further, the court ruled that
Rug does not subject unadjudicated criminal act evidence to a "heightened
reliability' standard in capital sentencing and Powell's claimthat hears ayevidence
is allowed under Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B) was "simplywrong."" The
court found that the trial court's determination, that Virginia's capital charging
and sentencing scheme was constitutional, was not erroneous."
C L i g VoirDire andFailue to StikeJury Pane
Powell made two claims concerning the trial court's handling of the voir dire
process.66 First, Powell argued that the trial court erred in not allowing him to
question potential jurors about their abilityto remain impartial in the face of the
knowledge that Powell had previously been convicted for the capital murder of
Stacey.6 ' Although Powell conceded that Barkerv QtwmmzeahW makes knowl-
edge of a defendant's prior conviction grounds for dismissing a potential juror,
Powell argued that the jury members would inevitably hear about the prior
conviction at trial and he was entitled to question them about its effect on their
judgment.69 The court began by stating that the purpose of voir dire was " 'to
ascertain whether [a prospective juror] is related to either party, or has any
61. Id
62. Id
63. Id;seCharkv. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784,791 (Va. 1979) (finding that aggravating
factors must be proven by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt).
64. Potdl, 590 S.E.2d at 555-56; seeJackson v. Commonwealth, 590 S1E.2d 520, 526 (Va.
2004) (stating that "Code S 19.2-264.4(B) does not contain a relaxed evidentiary standard or
produce unreliable determinations of aggravating factors"); Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826
(Va. 2003) (finding that mitigation evidence classified as hearsaywas not improperlyexcluded under
section 19.2-264.4(B)). For a complete discussion and analysis of Jadson and Loztt, seeoavauy
Maxwell C Smith, Case Note,16 CAP. DEF. J. 533 (2004) (analyzing (Jerry) Jackson v. Common-
wealth, 590 S.E.2d 520 (2004)), and Meghan H Morgan, Case Note, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 573 (2004)
(analyzing Lovitt v. Warden, 585 S.E.2d 801 (Va. 2003)).
65. Poud4 590 S.E.2d at 556.
66. Id at 559.
67. Id
68. 337 S.E.2d 729 (Va. 1985).
69. Poued4 590 S.E.2d at 559; see Barker v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 729, 733 (Va. 1985)
(finding knowledge of a defendant's prior conviction for the charged offense to be grounds for the
dismissal of a potential juror).
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interest in the cause, or has expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of
anybias or prejudice therein.' "70 With such a stated purpose, venirepersons may
only be asked questions relevant to a determination of whether they should be
removed for cause.7' The court then recited the test for relevancy fromLeVasseur v C nn'mealIZ2 "[t]he test of relevancy is whether the questions
relate to any of the four criteria set forth in the statute. If an answer to the
question would necessarily disclose, or clearly lead to the disclosure of the
statutory factors ofrelationship,interest, opinion, or prejudice, it must be permit-
ted."73 The court found that the question Powell posed to the jury would not
have illuminated any of "the four statutory factors of relationship, interest,
opinion, or prejudice." 4 The court ruled that whether to allow the question was
within the trial court's discretion and that the trial court did not err in disallowing
Powell's question.
7
Second, Powell claimed that the five jurors that were subjected to his
question concerning the prior conviction should have been disqualified rather
than simply instructed to disregard the question. 6 Powell contended that this
conclusion was compelled by Barker' The court ruled that the cause of the
potential jurors grounds for dismissal in this case was Powell's question and that,
therefore, the jurors were not required to be dismissed under the "invited error"
doctrine.78 The invited error doctrine prevents a defendant from benefitting
from trial counsel's "voluntary, strategic choice."79 For this reason, the court
ruled that the trial judge did not err in allowing the jurors to be impaneled."0
D. MitigangMenta Halth Eriden
The court combined two issues raised by Powell together with its manda-
toryreview of Powell's death sentence as required bythe Virginia statute because
70. Poud4 590 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. 5 8.01-358 (Michie 2000)).
71. Id
72. 304 S.E.2d 644 (Va. 1983).
73. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 559 (quoting LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 304 S.E.2d 644,653 (Va.
1983)); LeVasseur, 304 S.E.2d at 653.
74. Poud, 590 S.Eld at 559.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id; s&eBarker, 337 S.E2d at 733 (requiring dismissal of potential jurors with knowledge
of defendant's prior conviction).
78. Poud4 590 S.E.2d at 559-60.
79. Id at 560 (citing Moore v. Hinlde, 527 S.E.2d 419,426 (Va. 2000), Saunders v. Common-
wealth, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (Va. 1970), and Clark v. Commonwealth, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 (Va.
1961)).
80. Id
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Powell's claims "parallel[ed] the mandatory review of every death sentence th[e]
Court conducts pursuant to Virginia Code section 17.1-313(C). ." The court first
addressed Powell's claim that the jury's verdict was the result of passion, preju-
dice, or some other arbitrary factor. 2 The court next reviewed the decision to
determine if the sentence of death was disproportionate when compared to
similar cases. 3
1. Passiom, Pjudi, or Some OtherA bhtrary Factor
Powell made three separate contentions concerning the jury's passion,
prejudice, or some other arbitrary factor in reaching a verdict.84 First, Powell
claimed that the "graphic and irrelevant" testimony of Kristie Reed concerning
the attack by Powell "virtually assured... a sentence of death."" The court
found the testimony and evidence of the attack on Kristie relevant to a determi-
nation of guilt as well as relevant to a determination of future dangerousness
during penalty deliberations. 6 The court ruled that although graphic testimony
of "[t]he brutal rape and attempted murder of a thirteen-year-old child are
undoubtedly among the most abhorrent crimes that can be placed in evidence
before a jury contemplating whether to impose a sentence of death," there is no
presumption that the jurycannot remain unbiased in the face of such testimony.8 7
Powell's second contention, not raised at trial, was that his death sentence
should have been set aside because the verdict form the jury used allowed it to
sentence Powell to life and a fine but did not instruct the jury, as did the judge,
to use the form if neither aggravating factor had been proven beyond a reason-
able doubt.8" The court reviewed the trial record and found no indication that
the jury did not fairly consider all the evidence in mitigation and aggravation and
that the jury found both aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 9 The
court found "nothing to suggest that the jury, or the trial court in reviewing the
81. ld;seVA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q (Mfichie 2003) (providing for the mandatoryreview
of everydeath sentence handed down in Virginia to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was
imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor, and... [w]hether
the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant").
82. Poud4 590 S.E.2d at 561.
83. Id at 562.
84. Id at 561.
85. Id at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Id at 561.
87. Id (citing Bailey v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 570, 586 (Va. 2000)).
88. PoAd, 590 S.E.2d at 561.
89. Id
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verdict, imposed the death sentence under the influence of passion, prejudice, or
other arbitrary factors."'9
Finally, Powell contended that the error in the juryverdict form entitled him
to a new sentencing proceeding.9' The court ruled that because Powell did not
raise the issue at trial, he had procedurallydefaulted the claim 2 The court ruled
that the "arbitraryfactor" language of Virginia Code section 17.1-313(Q(1) was
not to be used to raise an issue barred by failure to object at trial.93 The court
concluded that the alleged erroneous life sentence verdict form could be the basis
for commuting a sentence of death but could not be a basis for a new sentencing
proceeding.94
2. PmpmfionityReuew
Citing his mental health problems and inadequate treatment by the state
when he was in custody as a juvenile, Powell claimed that the sentence of death
in his case was disproportionate "when compared to similar cases considering
both the crime and the defendant."' The court identified the applicable mitigat-
ing factor in Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B), which provides as a mitigating
factor the inability of the defendant" 'to appreciate the criminalityof his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.' 96 The court found that
Powell's psychologist could not particularize Powell's mental health problems
nor did he testify that Powell satisfied the strictures of section 19.2-264.4(B). 97
This testimony was heard by the jury and the court concluded that the jury did
not consider it a sufficient mitigating factor.
98
Next, the court conducted its statutorily mandated review of Powell's
sentence of death.99 The court was required "to conduct a comparative review
of the death sentence imposed in this case with other capital murder cases,
including those where a life sentence was imposed."1" The court observed that
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id
93. Id (citing Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 653 n.6, 656 n.7 (Va. 1982)); se
VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(1) (Nichie 2003) (providing for the mandatoryreviewof everydeath
sentence handed down in Virginia to determine "[w]hether the sentence of death was imposed
under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor").
94. Poud!, 590 S.E.2d at 561-62.
95. 1d at 562.
96. Id (quoting VA. CODE ANN. 5 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000)).
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(Q(1) (Michie 2003) (providing for the mandatory
review of every death sentence).
100. Poua, 590 S.E.2d at 562.
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"'[t]he purpose of [this] comparative review[was] to reach a reasoned judgment
regarding what cases justifythe imposition of the death penalty."""' The court
focused its analysis on cases involving murder during the commission of rape or
attempted rape and a sentence of death that was predicated on either a finding
of future dangerousness or vileness. 2 The court also reviewed cases in which
the defendant received a life sentence when facing similar charges. 3 After
reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances contained in the record,
the court ruled that Powell's sentence was not disproportionate when compared
with similar cases. 0 4
IV. Applicaion m Vigia
A. Ccitflation fIlndnt and Bill f Patidars
In denying Powell's double jeopardy claim, the court relied on the fact that
Kristie Reed was identified in the bill of particulars as the victim of the attempted
rape that made Stacey's murder a capital offense."5 The identityof the attempted
rape victim was unknown without the bill of particulars.0 6 Thus, double jeop-
ardy would have likely barred Powell's second trial because his initial capital
conviction might have been predicated on the attempted rape of Stacey, a crime
for which the evidence was insufficient. The decision of the Supreme Court of
Virginia reversing Powell's original death sentence would have barred retrial
because that decision amounted to an appellate acquittal under Buwks. °7
Although recognizing that a bill of particulars is not a charging document,
the court permitted the bill of particulars in this case to define the factual specif-
ics of the generic crime found bythe grand jury"'8 The bill of particulars could
have properly served to narrow the indictment by specifically alleging the at-
101. Id (quoting Orbe v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (Va. 1999)).
102. Id at 562. The Supreme Court of Virginia cited the following cases in conducting its
review. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 332 (Va. 2001); Swisher v. Commonwealth, 506
S.E.2d 763 (Va. 1998); Pruert v. Commonwealth, 351 S.E.2d 1 (Va. 1986); Coleman v. Common-
wealth, 307 S.E.2d 864 (Va. 1983); Mason v. Commonwealth, 254 S.E.2d 116 (Va. 1979); and Smith
v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
103. Poudl, 590 S.E.2d at 563 (citing Home v. Commonwealth, 339 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1986) and
Keil v. Commonwealth, 278 S.E.2d 826 (Va. 1981)); sw also Bums v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d
872, 896 (Va. 2001) (citing KFan a d Home as representative cases in which a life sentence was
imposed for capital murder with attempted rape as the predicate offense).
104. PoudI, 590 S.E.2d at 563.
105. Id at 554.
106. Id
107. See Bwks, 437 U.S. at 18 ("Since we hold today that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the
only'just' remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal").
108. Pou&, 590 S.E.2d at 554.
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tempted rape of Kristie because the initial indictment did not allege a victim- 09
Depending on the evidence presented to the grand jury, however, it could have
been an impermissible expansion of the indictment bythe bill of particulars. If
the grand juryhad heard evidence of the attempted rape of Staceyand had issued
the indictment based on that evidence, the bill of particulars would have
impermissibly expanded the charged offense to include the attempted rape of
Kristie. The expansion of an indictment in this manner transfers the power of
charging the defendant from the grand jury to the prosecution and violates
section 19.2-217. "o
B. Co iug d.Eid iaryStan ,iApplicae to
Mi wgand A rawaig Eide,,e
In L oeff v Qbio,"' the United States Supreme Court held that, under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the sentencer cannot be precluded from
considering, as a mitigating factor, anyrelevant evidence proffered bythe defense
as a basis to consider a lesser sentence than death.'12 Moreover, Gen v oia 113
held that exclusion of highly relevant mitigating evidence through mechanical
application of the hearsay nile is a violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."4
In Virginia, a defendant is statutorily precluded from presenting certain
mitigating evidence."' The first sentence of the second paragraph of Virginia
Code section 19.2-264.4(B) explicitly commands that all evidence in mitigation
is subject to the rules of evidence." 6 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has held, citing to 19.2-264.4(B), that hearsay evidence is inadmissible
during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial t17 Because the limitations
placed onthe capital defendant bysection 19.2-264.4(B) lead to arbitrarydetermi-
nations of death sentences and violate a defendant's due process rights by
109. Id
110. SW VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-217 (ichie 2000) ("[N]o person shall be put upon trial for
any felony, unless an indictment or presentment shall have first been found or made by a grand jury
in a court of competent jurisdiction ....
111. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
112. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
113. 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam).
114. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (per curiam).
115. S&. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (ichie Supp. 2003) (providing for the application
of the rules of evidence to the admission of mitigating evidence).
116. Id
117. SwL ozit4 585 S.E.2d at 826 (finding that mitigation evidence classified as hearsaywas not
improperly excluded under section 19.2-264.4(B)).
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ignoring the mandates of L ockett and Gn, the statute must be declared uncon-
stitutional."'
In Pou d, the Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on L ortt, ruled that section
19.2-264.4(B) does not allow introduction of hearsay evidence, not otherwise
admissible, during the penalty phase." 9  Issued on the same day, Jadeson v
C th120 states even more starkly that "[e]vidence relevant to sentencing
in the penaltyphase of a capital murder trial is admissible, 'subject to the rules of
evidence governing admissibility.' "121 Insofar as Jadeson and Pouael relate to the
introduction of aggrauting evidence, the Supreme Court of Virginia is clearly
correct. In Rir the United States Supreme Court held that any fact upon which
the legislature authorizes an increase in punishment is the functional equivalent
of an element.' Evidence offered to prove an element must be subjected to
evidentiary rules that ensure reliability and diminish the unduly prejudicial effect
of some evidence that, in the capital case context, leads to unreliable and arbitrary
impositions of the death penalty. Otherwise, a defendant's Due Process and
Confrontation Clause rights would be severely restricted.'
This rationale does not applyto the introduction of mitigating evidence. In
EddiV v Ck*w, 2 4 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Lc&ett by declaring that a
"State maynot bystatute preclude the sentencer from considering anymitigating
factor."'25 In doing so, the Court held that mitigating evidence need not provide
a legal excuse for conduct but that a jury should be allowed to consider any
relevant evidence that mayexplain a defendant's behavior.'26 Furthermore,M
u Mararx27 held that a jury cannot be required nor be misled to believe that it
must unanimouslyfind the existence of mitigating circumstances."2 This prece-
dent, when read in combination with Rirg compels the determination that
mitigating factors are not elements and strict evidentiarystandards necessaryfor
118. For a motion challenging the constitutionality of Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(B),
please contact the Virginia Capital Case CLearinghouse at (540) 458-8557.
119. Pozed, 590 S.E.2d at 555; se VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (providing that evidence
at sentencing is admissible "subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility").
120. 590 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 2004).
121. Jadkson, 590 S.E.2d at 526 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B)).
122. R*? 536 U.S. at 605.
123. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608
(1967) (requiring procedural safeguards for a determination of future dangerousness in a separate
proceeding that increased the sentence for those convicted under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act).
124. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
125. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
126. Id
127. 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
128. NM v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988).
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just determinations of the existence of elements are neither necessarynor permit-
ted in the determination of mitigating factors.
C Periato n j em tePrt~o aomityRedew
With PouOl, the Supreme Court of Virginia perpetuates its inadequate
proportionality review by relying solely on cases that come before the court,
rather than all capital cases." 9 In Burrs, Justice Kinser stated that "our propor-
tionality analysis encompasses all capital murder cases presentad to tis Cacrt for
review and is not limited to these selected cases." 3 ' If the court limits its review
to only cases that come before it, its review "encompasses" very little.
Because cases that result in a sentence of death are bynecessityreviewed by
the Supreme Court of Virginia under section 17.1-313, the court sees all death
cases.' Life cases must be appealed first to the Virginia Court of Appeals.
Those cases only reach the Supreme Court of Virginia as discretionary appeals,
and then only for alleged trial error.'32 These cases, therefore, cannot be based
on the sentencing proceedings. As a result, the record in life cases reflects trial
error issues that pertain very little to a comparative review of sentencing deci-
sions. For example, in Horne u Cmrnvmuukh, a case cited for comparison by
the PozeO and Burns courts, the issue appealed was an alleged Fourth Amendment
search and seizure violation.'34 The court cannot adequately compare like cases
when the record of cases it chooses to compare are manifestly different.
The Supreme Court of Virginia must expand the cases it uses in its statutory
review to include all cases of similarly charged defendants. This necessitates the
inclusion of cases that were not appealed after the imposition of a life sentence.
Only the trial court record will provide an adequate basis for the supreme court
to compare cases resulting in death and those resulting in life. This expansion
would allow the court to review the actual sentencing proceedings in cases that
resulted in life sentences rather than reviewing decisions based on irrelevant trial
129. Poud, 590 S.E.2d at 562-63.
130. Bunr, 541 S.E.2d at 896-97 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
131. SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(Q(1) (Michie 2003) (providing for the mandatoryreview
of every death sentence).
132. Life sentences are not appealed because with a capital conviction a life sentence is the
minimum sentence that can be imposed. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(A) (Michie 2000)
("Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of an offense which may be punishable by death, a
proceeding shall be held which shall be limited to a determination as to whether the defendant shall
be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.").
133. 339 S.E.2d 186 (Va. 1986).
134. SeHorm, 339 S.E.2d at 187 (stating that the sole issue to be decided was "[t)he issue [of]
whether Sylvester Junior Home was constitutionally in custody at the time he made certain
statements to the police which led ultimately to his conviction for rape and capital murder during
the commission of, or subsequent to, rape").
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error grounds. Until the court expands its range of cases for proportionality
review, the adequacy of its results will remain questionable.
V. Callioawn
Poud] illustrates the flexible charging requirements from which the Com-
monwealth benefits. Absent a specific indictment, the Commonwealth can issue
a bill of particulars that adds factual specificity to an element of the charged
offense. This case also underscores the court's tendencyto confuse the eviden-
tiary standard that is constitutionally required in the presentation of mitigating
evidence with the standard applicable to aggravating evidence. The court, relying
on section 19.2-264.4(B), continues its effort to limit Lockett and Edd, and
ignore Gram Finally, this case serves to continue the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's inadequate proportionality review. Until the pool of cases used as a basis
of comparison is expanded to include more life sentence cases with an adequate
record of the sentencing proceedings, the Supreme Court of Virginia's review
procedures will remain ineffective.
Terrence T. Egland
K. Brent Tomer
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